COCKING & KENNET: FRIENDSHIP AND MORAL DANGER

In Friendship and Moral Danger, Dean Cocking and Jeanette Kennett challenge the the highly moralized view that friendship is always in line with morality and that friendship is always an important human good. Cocking and Kennett give several examples, such as Death In Brunswick, that challenge these beliefs in scenarios where a friend’s behavior is universally morally wrong, yet would be common, acceptable or even required behavior of a true and good friend.

They focus on two central claims:

1. “In some cases we are led morally astray by virtue of a relationship that makes its own demands on us, the relationship in question is properly called a friendship.”

2. “Relationships of this kind are valuable in their own right.”

It is generally agreed upon in philosophy that a good and true friendship involves:

1. Mutual affection

2. Promoting the other’s wellbeing

3. Desire for shared experience

Cocking and Kennett add:

1. Mutual Drawing: One’s own interests, self-conception, and character are influenced by the other’s interpretation of them and the other’s interests, self-conception and character.

a. There is a receptiveness to the other’s preferences and interests, even when they may differ from your own interests. This receptiveness acts as an action-guiding force. For example, if I like watching cricket matches and I suggest to my friend that we go see a cricket match together, she may be interested in going even though she isn’t interested in cricket, but because I am interested in cricket. In the end, after attending a few cricket matches with me, she may develop a love for cricket as well. On the other hand, if it were a classmate that she just met, then she would probably just turn down the offer. Or she may go, but not be as drawn by the classmate’s enthusiasm and be bored at the cricket match.

b. There is a recognition and highlighting of each other’s characters. We are also receptive to having the other direct and interpret us, thereby changing our self-conception.

This comes to show that friends can transform each other. This mutual drawing usually does not, but could lead to moral danger. Cocking and Kennett give two examples. Suppose you become friends with someone who is reckless or gambles. You may be drawn to them because of this recklessness and feel enticed to engage in reckless behavior or gamble with them.

Cocking and Kennett’s account of friendship also critiques the plural moral-values view of friendship. “The plural moral-values view focuses on the altruistic concern we have for the friend's well-being as the core moral value in friendship.” Both this and the highly moralized view emphasize that friendship contributes to moral growth, and that this labels friendship as a good within a moral. Cocking and Kennett argue that we shouldn’t place too much weight on this because friendship can lead us to make moral compromises.

Some would argue that if a friendship leads us to commit moral transgressions, then it is not in fact a good and true friendship, and therefore the argument does not apply. The following are arguments that offer evidence against the two central claims along with Cocking and Kennett’s rebuttal:

Conflict claim: A relationship that leads one morally astray is not a true friendship.

1. If one commits moral wrongs against one person such as lying or cheating, they cannot be trusted to not to do the same to their friend. If you can't trust them, they are not a close friend.

Rebuttal: We act partially to our friends. Even a “rapacious business tycoon” or a ruthless dictator can be know as a loyal best friend to someone without fear of them stealing, lying or killing you.

2. A friend wouldn’t get you involved in a problem of theirs that could get you into serious trouble, expect you to cover for them, or lie for them. If they do, then they are exploiting you, which is against true friendship.

Rebuttal: Nobody is without their flaws. We all get into sticky situations and a friend is usually one of the first places one turns to for help. It is not against friendship to give help to a friend even if it requires moral wrongdoing.

Friendship conflicts with the major moral theories of Kantianism and consequentialism. Does it seem plausible to conduct all friendships within a moral framework, in such a way that whenever there is a conflict between friendship and morality, the moral considerations always come first? This is rarely the case in our everyday experiences and accounts of friendship, therefore it doesn’t seem plausible.

Conclusion:

Although it was thought that friends should lead us to moral growth, in reality, our friends are rarely moral saints and have their faults. If we focus only on the well-being of our friend, we will miss much of the good of friendship. Mutual drawing accounts for much of the good in friendship but can also lead us morally astray.

“Here we have claimed that the good of friendship does not sit well within the moral framework… by showing that the nature of our commitment to, and interest in, our friends is inherently likely to lead us into moral danger.”

Cocking, Dean, and Jeanette Kennett. "Friendship and Moral Danger." The Journal of Philosophy 97.5 (2000): 278-96. JSTOR. PDF. 16 Dec. 2015.

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